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AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS V. 
COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT: A TRIBE’S 




When the well’s dry, we know the worth of water. 
– Benjamin Franklin1 
The Ninth Circuit began its landmark opinion in Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District with this quote, not 
merely for stylistic appeal, but to highlight the importance of the issue 
discussed in the case: the allocation of water rights. The world currently 
faces a global water crisis, with drinkable water supplies diminishing each 
day.2 The Western United States provides a gleaming example of this crisis, 
where the arid environment has all but eliminated surface water resources 
and left the land in a permanent drought.3 Given the impact of the water 
crisis on industries and individuals alike, parties increasingly turn to courts 
to answer the crucial question: who possesses rights to the remaining 
water? 
The answer to this question implicates multiple parties, including state 
water agencies, the federal government, and Indian tribes. States normally 
create and enforce their own water law, with the federal government 
granting them great deference in most issues.4 However, the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 2. See generally Water Scarcity, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife. 
org/threats/water-scarcity (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 3. See generally Dennis Dimick, 5 Things You Should Know About California’s Water 
Crisis, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 6, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/ 
150406-california-drought-snowpack-map-water-science/; United States v. New Mexico, 
438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978). 
 4. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32198, INDIAN RESERVED WATER 
RIGHTS UNDER THE WINTERS DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW (2011). 
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federal reserved water rights, which recognizes that the federal government 
impliedly reserves water upon creating tribal reservations,5 “represents a 
limited exception to the general rule that individual states govern water 
rights.”6 Often referred to as the “Winters doctrine,” due to the historic 
Supreme Court case first discussing this issue, these federally reserved 
rights carry with them a type of seniority over state water rights.7  
While state and federal courts have upheld the doctrine of federal 
reserved water rights for the past century, many questions remain regarding 
how to apply the doctrine today. One such question concerns whether a 
tribe’s federally reserved water rights, if established, extend beyond surface 
water to also encompass groundwater.8 In Agua Caliente, the Ninth Circuit 
became the first federal appellate court to address this issue. However, 
given the implications of the court’s decision on competing water rights, it 
most likely will not be the last. Ambiguity surrounding the Winters doctrine 
has left interested parties geared for litigation to preserve their increasingly 
precious water rights in the face of extreme shortages in arid parts of the 
country.9  
This Note will examine the doctrine of federal reserved water rights, 
known commonly as the Winters doctrine, with a focus on the recently-
decided Ninth Circuit case, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Coachella Valley Water District. Part I will provide the origin of tribes’ 
federally reserved water rights through discussion of three Supreme Court 
cases on the doctrine, starting with Winters v. United States. Part II will 
discuss Agua Caliente in detail, highlighting the factual scenario leading to 
the litigation, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s novel application of the Winters 
doctrine to groundwater. Part III will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
with emphasis placed on its determination regarding the role of United 
States v. New Mexico in establishing the Tribe’s federally reserved water 
right. Part III will also consider whether the court appropriately extended 
the Winters doctrine to groundwater. Finally, Part IV will focus on the 
impact of Agua Caliente on competing water rights. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 6. FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL., 94 C.J.S. WATERS § 360 (2017). 
 7. BROUGHER, supra note 4. 
 8. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976). 
 9. BROUGHER, supra note 4. 
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I. The Legacy of the Doctrine of Federal Reserved Water Rights 
Both the Commerce Clause and Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution empower the federal government to reserve water rights for 
specific purposes.10 While the doctrine of federal reserved water rights 
applies to other federal enclaves, the application of the doctrine often 
implicates tribal reservations.11 The landmark Supreme Court decision, 
Winters v. United States, emphasizes the importance of the relationship 
between tribes and federally reserved rights. In Winters, the federal 
government sued on behalf of the tribes living on the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation to keep a group of settlers from obstructing the water of the 
Milk River from reaching the reservation.12 On May 1, 1888, the federal 
government established the Fort Belknap Reservation “as and for a 
permanent home and abiding place of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboing 
[tribes]”13 in an attempt to transform them from nomads to 
agriculturalists.14 However, to achieve this goal on the reservation’s “dry 
and arid” lands, the tribes, in conjunction with the federal government, 
argued the necessity of allowing the “[Milk] river [to] flow down the 
channel uninterruptedly and undiminished in quantity . . . .”15  
Hoping to build dams on the Milk River to better utilize its water,16 the 
settlers based their argument on the 1888 treaty establishing the reservation, 
arguing the treaty “‘ceded, sold, transferred, and conveyed’ to the United 
States all of the lands embraced in [the tribes’ former larger land holding], 
except Fort Belknap Indian reservation.”17 From the settlers’ perspective, 
the tribes no longer held title to the greater part of the land, which included 
the parts of the Milk River on which they had settled.18 They therefore 
argued that after the 1888 treaty, the federal government owned the land 
and “[threw it] open to settlement” for individuals like themselves.19 In 
their prayer for relief, the settlers emphasized the valueless nature of their 
lands without access to the Milk River, stating that a lack of water would 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138. 
 11. BROUGHER, supra note 4. 
 12. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 566-67. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 565. 
 17. Id. at 567. 
 18. Id. at 568. 
 19. Id. 
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inevitably force the dissolution of the communities and defeat “the purpose 
and object of the government in opening said lands for settlement . . . .”20 
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna focused on the May 1888 treaty 
in order to decipher the purpose of establishing the reservation.21 In doing 
so, he recognized that the creation of the reservation intended to transform 
the Tribes from nomads to “a pastoral and civilized people.”22 However, the 
arid nature of the land, without water to support it, made it virtually 
valueless.23 Because the Tribes could not accomplish the purpose of the 
reservation without access to and use of the Milk River, Justice McKenna 
found in favor of the Tribes and the federal government, holding that “the 
United States intended to reserve sufficient water for the needs of 
agriculture on the reservation.”24 This decision created the doctrine of 
federal reserved water rights, or, the Winters doctrine: “[W]hen the Federal 
Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a 
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant 
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose 
of the reservation.”25  
Over the next seventy years, the Winters doctrine remained relatively 
intact, with only one prominent case discussing the quantification of 
federally reserved water rights.26 Despite the passage of time, the Winters’ 
test for determining whether the federal government impliedly reserved 
water rights when creating federally designated lands remained solid 
precedent. Between 1976 and 1978, however, the Supreme Court issued 
two decisions that broadened and subsequently narrowed the scope of the 
Winters doctrine.27  
In Cappaert v. United States, the Supreme Court decided whether the 
status of Devil’s Hole as a national monument included impliedly reserved 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 570. 
 21. Id. at 575. 
 22. Id. at 576. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Raphael J. Moses, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine–From 1866 Through 
Eagle County, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 221, 230 (1975). 
 25. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see also BROUGHER, supra 
note 4. 
 26. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (deciding the 
quantification of water rights is no more than the amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of 
the reservation).  
 27. 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 5:36 (2d ed. 2007) (Federal Implied Reserved Water Rights – Cappaert 
and New Mexico). 
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federal water rights.28 Though not addressing a tribe’s water rights, the case 
implicated the Winters doctrine because Devil’s Hole was designated as a 
federal enclave. In 1952, President Truman made Death Valley “a national 
monument ‘for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, 
and educational interest therein contained.’”29 The proclamation included 
Devil’s Hole as part of the monument, given the cavernous pool’s unique 
presence of a rare species of fish.30 In making the national monument, 
President Truman declared that the presence of the fish made the pool “of 
such outstanding scientific importance” that it required “special 
protection.”31  
Almost twenty years after President Truman designated the pool as part 
of the national monument, defendant-petitioners began pumping 
groundwater to support their nearby ranch, unknowingly pulling from an 
aquifer that sourced Devil’s Hole.32 As a result, the water level in Devil’s 
Hole decreased, placing the rare species of fish at risk of extinction.33 After 
unsuccessfully litigating extensive state administrative proceedings, the 
federal government sought an injunction limiting the Cappaerts’ 
groundwater pumping.34  
While deciding whether President Truman had impliedly reserved a 
federal water right when creating the national monument, the Supreme 
Court in Cappaert reaffirmed the Winters doctrine, stating: 
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right 
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is 
whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and 
thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously 
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes 
for which the reservation was created.35 
Because President Truman specifically stated “‘the pool . . . should be 
given special protection’” when designating Devil’s Hole as a national 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 131. 
 29. Id. at 132. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 133. 
 33. Id. at 133-34. 
 34. Id. at 134-35. 
 35. Id. at 139. 
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monument, the Court found a federally reserved water right that trumped 
state-created rights.36  
One of the most significant aspects of Cappaert was the Court’s 
discussion of whether the Winters doctrine applied to groundwater, marking 
the first time the Supreme Court had addressed that question.37 The Court 
determined that because “[the] doctrine is based on the necessity of water 
for the purpose of the federal reservation,” the federal government could 
protect its water “whether [it was] surface or groundwater.”38 However, 
because the Court concluded Devil’s Hole contained surface water, the 
precedential value of its extension of Winters to groundwater remained 
uncertain.39  
While the Court interpreted the Winters doctrine expansively in 
Cappaert, just two years later, it seemingly reversed course. In United 
States v. New Mexico, the federal government claimed reserved water rights 
from the Rio Mimbres for recreation, stockwatering, and wildlife 
preservation of a national forest.40 The Supreme Court started its opinion by 
following the decision in Cappaert, emphasizing that because “the 
President [has] the power to reserve portions of the federal domain for 
specific federal purposes,” Congress had “impliedly authorized him to 
reserve ‘appurtenant water [then] unappropriated to the extent needed to 
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.’”41 
The New Mexico Court, however, ultimately diverged from the 
expansive Cappaert holding. Instead, it relied on Arizona v. California, 
which quantified the amount of reserved water at no more than what was 
“necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,”42 to create a primary-
secondary distinction for federally reserved water rights:  
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 140, 145. 
 37. Id. at 142. 
 38. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).  
 39. Id. at 142-43; see also CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW DESKBOOK § 8.12 (2018 ed.) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK] 
(“Miscellaneous issues- Groundwater”) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that a reserved right can 
be protected from adjacent groundwater diversions. However, the reserved water right in 
Cappaert was in an underground pool, which the Court characterized as ‘underground 
surface water, and not groundwater.’”). 
 40. 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978). 
 41. Id. at 699-700 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138). 
 42. Id. at 700 (internal quotation omitted); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 
595-601 (1963). 
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Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a 
federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, 
even in the face of Congress’ express deference to state water 
law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the 
necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary 
use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary 
inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, 
that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as 
any other public or private appropriator.43 
The Court supported its finding of a primary-secondary distinction by 
analyzing the Organic Administration Act of 1897, which established that 
the federal government reserves national forests “‘[t]o conserve the water 
flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people.’”44 
Additionally, the Court looked to the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 
1960 for Congress’s stated policy that national forests be administered “for 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish 
purposes.”45  
Although the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act proved Congress had 
expanded the purposes of national forests after the inception of the Organic 
Administration Act, the Court, the Court declined to establish federally 
reserved water rights for these purposes because the Act provided “no 
indication that [Congress] believed the new purposes to be so crucial as to 
require a reservation of additional water.”46 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court refused to recognize a federally reserved water right for 
stockwatering on the Rio Mimbres, given its status as a secondary purpose 
in the creation of the national forest.47 The Court effectively required an 
express reservation of water to establish federally reserved rights, rather 
than using the Winters doctrine to determine whether water was impliedly 
reserved to fulfill the purposes of the federally reserved lands.48  
After two Supreme Court decisions on the Winters doctrine in a two-year 
period, federal case law concerning impliedly reserved water rights 
remained unchanged until the Ninth Circuit decided Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District. 
                                                                                                                 
 43. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. 
 44. Id. at 707; see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 27. 
 45. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713. 
 46. Id. at 715. 
 47. Id. at 717. 
 48. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 27. 
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II. Expanding Federally Reserved Water Rights to Groundwater 
While the Agua Caliente Tribe’s occupation of the Coachella Valley 
predates California’s statehood, two presidential executive orders in 1876 
and 1877 formally created the reservation.49 The executive orders reserved 
the land for “the permanent use and occupancy of the Mission Indians in 
southern California,” and set aside additional land in 1877 for “Indian 
purposes.”50 These orders followed government reports urging the creation 
of reservations to allow tribes to settle and build homes on the land.51 
Between these reports and the executive orders, the federal government 
intended to “secure the Mission Indians permanent homes, with land and 
water enough.”52 
The nature of the Coachella Valley’s desert environment caused many 
issues for establishing sustainable living conditions.53 Due to the minimal 
rainfall and seasonally-fluctuating water levels produced by the Whitewater 
River System, the area contains very little surface water.54 As a result, the 
Coachella Valley Groundwater Basin, an aquifer beneath the valley, is the 
main source of water for the region.55 This life-sustaining water basin does 
not only provide water to the Agua Caliente Tribe, but also to “9 cities, 
400,000 people, and 66,000 acres of farmland.”56 As demand for the 
groundwater grows, the aquifer’s water level declines, despite efforts to 
elevate water levels through groundwater pumping.57 
Historically, the Tribe received minimal water from the local river 
system under the Whitewater River Decree and fulfilled all other water 
needs by purchasing it from the defendant water agencies.58 While this 
agreement worked initially, the steadily declining groundwater levels 
increased tensions regarding the use and control of the water.59 
Accordingly, the Agua Caliente Tribe filed suit against the local water 
agencies in May of 2013 to determine if it possessed a federally reserved 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 50. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1265-66 (internal quotation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 1266. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1267. 
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right to the groundwater in the aquifer.60 Because multiple issues arose 
from the suit, the parties elected to divide the litigation into three phases, 
focusing only on the first phase in the immediate case. The first phase 
addressed the Tribe’s potential federally reserved right to groundwater, 
leaving later phases to address quality and quantification of any potential 
rights.61 
In March of 2015, the district court granted partial summary judgment to 
the Tribe by holding “that the reserved rights doctrine applies to 
groundwater and that the United States reserved appurtenant groundwater 
when it established the Tribe’s reservation.”62 Without deciding Phase II 
and III of the litigation, the district court granted an interlocutory appeal, 
giving rise to the precedential Ninth Circuit decision.63 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Tribe’s claim of federally 
reserved rights to groundwater in three steps. The first step focused on 
whether the federal government impliedly reserved water when creating the 
reservation.64 After reaffirming the Winters doctrine, the court turned to 
whether the Tribe had any right to the area’s water, much less the 
groundwater, at issue.65 The primary-secondary distinction in New Mexico 
was central to this question. The defendant water agencies believed the 
holding in New Mexico “that water is impliedly reserved only if other 
sources of water then available cannot meet the reservation’s water 
demands” mandated an additional inquiry to determine whether a reserved 
right exists.66 In their view, “if other sources of water exist—and the lack of 
a federal right would not entirely defeat the purpose of the reservation—
then Congress intended to defer to state water law . . . .”67 
The court, however, disagreed with the water agencies’ narrow 
interpretation of New Mexico. In its view, the New Mexico decision 
remained true to the Winters doctrine, as the primary-secondary distinction 
only affected the amount of water reserved.68 Ultimately, because the 
primary-secondary distinction focused on quantification of a federally 
reserved right, “it did not [] eliminate the threshold issue—that a reserved 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1268. 
 66. Id. at 1269. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1270. 
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right exists if the purposes underlying a reservation envision access to 
water.”69  
Accordingly, the court sought to determine the purpose of the reservation 
and the role of water in fulfilling that purpose.70 The executive orders 
creating the reservation merely stated the federal government’s desire to 
allow “permanent use and occupancy” of the land by the Tribe.71 From 
these documents, the court recognized that “‘[t]he general purpose, to 
provide a home for the Indians, is . . . broad . . . and must be liberally 
construed.’”72 Noting the importance of water in sustaining the Tribe’s 
ability to live in such an arid environment, the court determined that the 
federal government established the reservation “to create a home for the 
Tribe” and that “water was necessarily implicated in that purpose.”73 
Therefore, a federally reserved water right existed from the creation of the 
reservation..74  
After determining the Agua Caliente Tribe had a federally reserved water 
right, the court tackled the second step of their analysis: whether that right 
extended to groundwater. To do so, the court focused on the 
“appurtenance” requirement in Winters.75 In its view, the appurtenance 
requirement only “limit[ed] the reserved right to those waters which are 
attached to the reservation,” rather than restricting the rights to solely 
surface water.76 The court supported this proposition with two sources. 
First, the Cappaert Court’s discussion on federal protection of groundwater 
eluded that “[i]f the United States can protect against groundwater 
diversions, it follows that the government can protect the groundwater 
itself.”77 Second, due to the lack of surface water in the western United 
States and the need for that water in creating sustainable living conditions, 
the inclusion of groundwater under Winters must occur if surface water 
proves inadequate.78 Because of the reality facing tribes in arid parts of the 
country, the court extended the Winters doctrine to appurtenant 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1265 (internal quotation omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1270 (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th 
Cir. 1981)).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1271. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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groundwater, meaning the Agua Caliente Tribe’s reserved water right 
encompassed the Coachella Valley aquifer.79  
Finally, in the third step of its opinion, the court addressed how the 
Tribe’s federally reserved right to both surface and groundwater related to 
state-created water rights. The state water agencies argued that the Tribe’s 
state-created correlative rights and the water it received from the 
Whitewater River Decree showed state law adequately protected the 
purpose of the reservation, making a federally reserved right unnecessary.80 
The defendants’ arguments did not prevail, however, as the court found 
federally reserved water rights preempt state water law.81  
In sum, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
Agua Caliente Tribe obtained a federally reserved water right through the 
establishment of their reservation.82 Most importantly, because Winters 
“[did] not distinguish between surface water and groundwater,” the Ninth 
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to extend these federally 
reserved water rights to groundwater.83 
III. Support for the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Agua Caliente  
At its core, Agua Caliente focused on two important issues: whether the 
Tribe had a federally reserved water right under Winters and whether that 
right encompassed groundwater. Through its analysis, the Ninth Circuit 
accurately interpreted New Mexico in finding a federally reserved water 
right for the Tribe and appropriately extended the Winters doctrine to 
encompass groundwater. 
A. The Agua Caliente Tribe’s Federally Reserved Water Right 
Before discussing the groundwater issue, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether the Tribe even possessed a federally reserved water right. In 
opposition to this notion, the defendant water agencies’ main argument 
focused on the primary-secondary distinction in New Mexico, which they 
believed allowed for a federally reserved right only if other sources of water 
proved inadequate for serving the purpose of the reservation.84 Therefore, 
“if other sources of water exist—and the lack of a federal right would not 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 1271-72. 
 80. Id. at 1272. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1269. 
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entirely defeat the purpose of the reservation—then Congress intended to 
defer to state water law . . . .”85 The Ninth Circuit found New Mexico 
unpersuasive as to whether a federally reserved water right exists, leaving 
the primary-secondary distinction analysis for quantifying any existing 
water rights in Phase III.86 
The Ninth Circuit properly refused to alter the Winters doctrine in light 
of New Mexico for two reasons. First, the primary-secondary distinction 
raised in New Mexico focuses on quantification of reserved water rights, 
which does not occur in this case until Phase III of the litigation. Although 
the distinction in New Mexico discusses the “purpose” requirement from 
Winters, the classification of primary or secondary purposes implies that a 
federally reserved water right must already exist under Winters. Because 
the federally reserved right exists, courts can then use the New Mexico 
distinction to determine the scope or quantity of the water right by labeling 
the purposes as primary or secondary. In essence, the New Mexico 
distinction serves as an additional step focusing on quantification that 
comes after a court has recognized a federally reserved water right. The 
issue presented in New Mexico supports the conclusion that the primary-
secondary distinction serves as an additional inquiry on quantification, 
asking “what quantity of water, if any, the United States reserved out of the 
Rio Mimbres when it set aside the Gila National Forest . . . .”87 Ultimately, 
as the Ninth Circuit held, the primary-secondary distinction “did not . . . 
eliminate the threshold issue—that a reserved right exists if the purposes 
underlying a reservation envision access to water.”88 
Second, even if the New Mexico distinction altered the Winters doctrine 
beyond giving guidelines on quantifying federally reserved rights, the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Agua Caliente mirrors the Court in New Mexico. In 
New Mexico, the Court used prior legislative acts, such as the Organic 
Administration Act of 1897, to show the federal government established 
national forests “[t]o conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous 
supply of timber for the people.”89 The Court determined that although 
Congress enacted the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, which 
broadened the purposes of national forests, Congress did not indicate “the 
new purposes to be so crucial as to require a reservation of additional 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1270. 
 87. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 88. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270. 
 89. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 (internal quotation omitted). 
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water.”90 Accordingly, the Court found a federally reserved water right to 
sustain only the primary purposes of national forests.91 
Following this same analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente 
assessed the purpose of the reservation in determining whether a federally 
reserved water right exists.92 From the executive orders stating the federal 
government established the reservation for “the permanent use and 
occupancy of the Mission Indians”93 in southern California, the court 
determined that “‘water . . . would be essential to the life of the Indian 
people.’”94 Unlike New Mexico, where conflicting legislative acts gave rise 
to the possibility for primary and secondary purposes, the executive orders 
and government reports surrounding the establishment of the reservation in 
Agua Caliente clearly intended one primary purpose: to “create a home for 
the Tribe.”95 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that 
the Agua Caliente had a federally reserved water right under the Winters 
doctrine and its subsequent cases, including New Mexico. 
B. The Extension of Winters to Groundwater 
Along with properly finding the Agua Caliente Tribe had a federally 
reserved water right, the Ninth Circuit appropriately extended the Winters 
doctrine to groundwater. To begin, an assessment of cases covering the 
Winters doctrine shows a trend of multiple courts including groundwater in 
tribes’ federally reserved rights.96 This trend began with Cappaert, where 
although the Supreme Court did not explicitly rule on the groundwater 
issue, it put forth the notion that the federal government had control over 
implied water rights whether surface or groundwater.97  
Following Cappaert, the Arizona Supreme Court in In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 715. 
 91. Id. at 718. 
 92. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270. 
 93. Id. at 1265 (internal quotation omitted). 
 94. Id. at 1270 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589-99 (1963)). 
 95. Id. (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
 96. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 39; see, e.g., In re the General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila III), 989 
P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968). But see In 
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Source decided a factually-similar case to Agua Caliente.98 The case 
contained six parts, all of which focused on general stream adjudication.99 
This part of the litigation (Gila III) discussed the groundwater question, 
with the trial court finding that federal rights should extend to 
groundwater.100 While affirming this holding, the Arizona Supreme Court 
discussed the main arguments against extending federally reserved rights to 
groundwater, countering with well-founded rationales as to why these 
arguments were not persuasive. Because the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Agua Caliente raises these same arguments, the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Gila provides an important starting point. 
The state water agencies in Gila III began their opposition to extending 
Winters to groundwater by urging the Arizona Supreme Court to not “apply 
a federal doctrine so disjunctive to established doctrines of [Arizona law],” 
given the United States Supreme Court had not explicitly done so.101 
However, the Gila III court, while recognizing the impact of its holding, 
felt it was not “writ[ing] on a blank slate,” but rather building on principles 
set forth in Winters, Cappaert, and Arizona.102  
To begin, the Arizona Supreme Court looked to Winters, where the 
Supreme Court realized the necessity of an implied reservation of water due 
to the Fort Belknap Reservation’s inability to sustain an agricultural 
lifestyle without it.103 The Gila III court highlighted that, like the Fort 
Belknap Reservation, other reservations “depend for present or future 
survival substantially or entirely upon pumping of underground water.”104 
From the court’s view, whether the water came from a stream or river, as it 
did in Winters, or from underground, the federal government must have 
intended to reserve “water necessary to sustain life.”105 Therefore, the court 
determined that “if the United States implicitly intended, when it 
established reservations, to reserve sufficient unappropriated water to meet 
the reservations’ needs, it must have intended that reservation of water to 
come from whatever particular sources each reservation had at hand.”106 
Ultimately, the Gila III court slightly limited its holding by only finding a 
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right to groundwater where surface water could not fulfill the purpose of the 
reservation.107  
The arguments and holding from Gila III bolster the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Agua Caliente. From a logistical standpoint, if a federally 
reserved water right exists because the purpose of the reservation could not 
be fulfilled without water, it therefore follows that those rights should 
encompass any available water. Specifically, if a federally reserved water 
right exists in a land with little to no surface water, as in Gila and Agua 
Caliente, the refusal to extend Winters to groundwater would in effect 
eliminate or make useless a tribe’s federally reserved water right. Like 
Gila III, the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente found that “survival is 
conditioned on access to water—and a reservation without an adequate 
source of surface water must be able to access groundwater.”108 
A further reading of the Gila III opinion also gives guidance on why 
deference to state water law could inhibit federally reserved water rights. It 
is well-established that “[reserved water] rights are paramount to water 
rights later perfected under state law.”109 However, courts narrowly 
construe the Winters doctrine to preserve states’ rights in this area.110 To 
balance these competing interests, courts must use the following assessment 
to determine whether to defer to state law: “Where federal rights are at 
issue, a state court may adopt state law as the rule of decision if to do so 
would not frustrate or impair a federal purpose.”111 Accordingly, the state 
water agencies in Gila III argued that due to the state’s riparian water 
system, which “provides all overlying landowners an equal right to pump as 
much groundwater as they can put to reasonable use,” no need existed to 
reserve additional groundwater.112 Therefore, deference to state water law 
would not “frustrate or impair”113 federally reserved rights.114 
However, the Gila III court again disagreed, pointing to the nature of 
federally reserved water rights. Because federally reserved water rights 
intend “‘to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at 750. 
 108. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 
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Reservations,’”115 the current equal right to pump groundwater does not 
prevent future overuse of groundwater to which tribes hold federally 
reserved rights.116 After finding Arizona’s “reasonable use” doctrine had 
allowed consumption of “far more groundwater than nature [could] 
replenish,” the Gila III court “[could not] conclude that deference to 
Arizona’s law—and to the opportunity it extends all landholders to pump as 
much groundwater as they can reasonably use—would adequately serve to 
protect federal rights.”117 
Like Arizona, California’s water system operates on a type of correlative 
rights framework.118 When specifically looking at groundwater, the state of 
California utilizes a riparian water system that, like Arizona, allows for 
groundwater pumping for any water landowners can put to “reasonable 
use.”119 Accordingly, like the system the Arizona Supreme Court addressed 
in Gila III, under California’s water system, “if the quantity of water in the 
basin were deemed insufficient, the Tribe would receive only its 
‘proportionate fair share’ of water based ‘on [its] current reasonable and 
beneficial need for water.’”120 From this framework, a possibility exists that 
the Tribe’s proportionate fair share of water under California water law 
might not be enough to “fulfill the purpose of the reservation.”121 Therefore, 
because state law might not be able to adequately protect the Agua Caliente 
Tribe’s federally reserved water right into the future, deference to state 
water law impairs the purpose of those rights and should not occur. 
Overall, while state court decisions like Gila III do not bind federal 
courts, their analyses support the growing trend to extend the Winters 
doctrine to groundwater, as the Ninth Circuit did in Agua Caliente. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Dale Ratliff, A Proper Seat at the Table: Affirming a Broad Winters Right to 
Groundwater, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 243 (2016). 
 119. The Water Rights Process, CAL. ST. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, 
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/water_rights_process.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2018). See generally Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903). 
 120. Ratliff, supra note 118, at 257 (quoting Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v. 
Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 121. Ratliff, supra note 118, at 257. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/6
No. 1] NOTES 219 
 
 
IV. The New Era of Federally Reserved Water Rights 
Because federally reserved rights under the Winters doctrine “are 
paramount to water rights later perfected under state law,”122 the extension 
of this doctrine to groundwater by the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente 
impacts not only tribes and water agencies in California, but all entities 
involved in water distribution across the nation. On a local scale, while 
interested parties understand tribes’ federally reserved rights trump state 
water rights, it is unclear how this holding will impact California’s 
groundwater allocation system.123  
To begin, California’s unique water law system utilizes prior 
appropriation for surface water, meaning “the first party to use water from a 
stream or river obtain[s] a priority right.”124 However, for groundwater, 
California follows a riparian system and “reasonable use” requirement 
previously described in Part III. Despite these state water law principles, 
because federally reserved water rights are superior to state-created water 
rights,125 the Tribe effectively has gained the only priority right over all 
other groundwater users governed by the state’s riparian system.126  
The priority groundwater rights of tribes stemming from the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision brought mixed reviews. Many tribal leaders, including 
Agua Caliente Tribal Chair Jeff Grubbe, praised the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
for making the reservation’s federally reserved right “settled law.”127 From 
the Tribe’s view, the case focused on giving the Tribe “a seat at the table” 
to make decisions about the aquifer, including whether to treat the imported 
Colorado River water and how to utilize their priority right.128 
While local tribes celebrate the favorable Ninth Circuit ruling, state and 
local water agencies have expressed serious concerns about the Tribe’s new 
priority right to groundwater. Because “many areas of the western United 
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States rely on groundwater as their only viable water source,”129 allowing 
tribes priority could have both economic and environmental impacts on 
local water use. According to the Desert Water Agency (DWA), “[t]he 
Agua Caliente does not have any pipes, pumps, infrastructure or expertise 
in water management,”130 meaning it could propose economically 
insensitive solutions to potential issues. For example, when assessing the 
Agua Caliente Tribe’s concern regarding the untreated Colorado River 
water entering the aquifer, Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD) 
experts’ only solutions yield costs of up to $450 more per year to the 
average consumer.131 Despite these costs, the Tribe continues to question 
the use of Colorado River water without providing other cost-efficient 
alternatives.132  
Agua Caliente also raised questions regarding how local consumers will 
obtain groundwater for routine utilities. DWA warned that not only could 
the Tribe unilaterally set the price for water sold to fulfill public utility 
needs, requiring the DWA and CVWD to raise consumers’ rates, but that 
“Coachella Valley residents could find themselves solely reliant on 
imported water supplies to satisfy their household needs.”133 Because the 
Tribe’s priority right will likely limit the water agencies’ access to 
groundwater, consumers could face “substantial cutbacks in water delivered 
to customers, higher rates, potential building moratoriums and damage to 
the region’s economy.”134 
The impact of the Agua Caliente holding is even broader than the 
previously mentioned local concerns. Observers saw this wide-reaching 
impact before the Ninth Circuit decided the case, as approximately forty 
tribes and tribal organizations filed an amicus brief supporting the Agua 
Caliente Tribe.135 Likewise, ten different states supported the water districts 
through an amicus brief, writing that all states “[have] an obvious stake in 
the preservation, maintenance and allocation of their most precious natural 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Ian James, Water Agencies Aim for Supreme Court, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, 
Cal.), Mar. 30, 2017, at A06 [hereinafter James, Water Agencies Aim for Supreme Court].  
 130. Water Rights Lawsuit, DESERT WATER, https://dwa.org/about-us/other/lawsuits/100-
water-rights-lawsuit (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). 
 131. Jim Barrett & Dave Luker, Valley Voice: If Suit Succeeds, Tribe Profits and You 
Lose Rights, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.) (May 25, 2013), https://www.cvwd. 
org/DocumentCenter/View/2466. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Water Rights Lawsuit, supra note 130. 
 134. Id.  
 135. James, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Appeal, supra note 123. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/6
No. 1] NOTES 221 
 
 
resource.”136 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s historic decision has given 
tribes “legal backing to assert rights to groundwater, which could in turn 
strengthen their positions in negotiations or court-administered 
adjudications divvying up water supplies.”137 
Conclusion 
Federally reserved water rights for Indian tribes have been an important, 
yet somewhat contentious, area of law since the advent of the Winters 
doctrine in 1908. Many federal and state cases have focused on the scope 
and nature of these rights, all leading to the Ninth Circuit’s landmark 
decision in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley 
Water District. In Agua Caliente, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend the 
doctrine of federal reserved rights to groundwater correctly interpreted 
precedent, including United States v. New Mexico, while balancing both 
policy concerns and the division of responsibilities between the states and 
federal government. Through the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Agua 
Caliente tribe gained a priority right to groundwater, bringing with it many 
triumphs for tribes and concerns for state water agencies. As the global 
water crisis continues and litigation increases over who possesses rights to 
the remaining water, the answer, while still uncertain, now clearly indicates 
one party: tribes. 
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